is the diagonal subspace of R 2~ described by the coordinates of the two players being the same.
In a generalized pursuit-evasion game, the same again ends when capture occurs, but the payoff is now the integral up to the capture time of some nonnegative function h, representing the energy used by the pursuer. A game of survival is even more complicated in that the payoff is now the integral up to capture time of a function h which may be positive or negative, possibly together with a terminal payoff. Mention should be made here of the work of Friedman 16-81 and Varaiya and Lin [12] , on pursuit-evasion and survival games. Rowever, our approach is an extension of ideas of our earlier papers P, 31.
We study generalized pursuit-evasion games by considering certain approximating fixed-time games. The main result is that, if a slightly modified Isaacs condition is satisfied all the approximating games have value and the limit of their values is shown to be a certain "extended value" of the original game. Our definition of extended value is slightly similar to one of Friedman [S, 81, but the details are quite different.
Finally in Section 6 relaxed controls are introduced for survival games and, in terms of the related relaxed game, the upper and lower extended values are related to the upper and lower values.
NOTATION
A differential game G played by two players Jr and Js for the time interval I = [to, Ts] is considered. Many of the concepts defined below, and the related results, exist if the time interval is allowed to be infinite. As, however, some of the quantities might then be infinite the situation where T,, < co will be discussed.
Let Y and Z be two compact metric spaces. A map cp : I -+ Y (resp., Z) is mea.wrabZe if for every continuous map $J : Y +. R (resp., z,l~ : Z -+ R, the real numbers) the map $0 ~JJ is measurable in the usual Lebesgue sense on I. At each time t E 1, J1 picks an element y(t) from Y and Js picks an element s(t) from 2 in such a way that the resulting functions, y : I--+ Y and x : I -+ 2, are measurable. When selecting y(t) J1 is aware only of the history of the game up to time t, and a similar restriction applies to Js . The set of all measurable functions y : I + Y is denoted by Al; the elements of A1 are called control functions for J1 . ~3'~ , the set of control functions for Ja , is similarly defined with 2 replacing Y.
The dynamics of the differential game are given by the family of ordinary differential equations:
together with an initial condition x(&J = x, .
Here x E Rm and t E I. f is a continuous function from I x R" x Y x 2' to R" satisfying a Lipschitz condition
whenever x r , x2 E R", t E I, y E Y and x E 2. K is a Lebesgue measurable function on I satisfying
to
Throughout the game the player Jr chooses y(t) so that the final payoff, defined below, is as large as possible, whilst the player J2 tries to make the final payoff as small as possible. We distinguish three types of differential game according to the form of the payoff P. First we have games of fixed duration where P = ~(4.)) + 1; W> 4% r(t), 4t>> dt.
Here Jr : I x R" x Y x 2 -+ R is continuous and p is a (nonlinear) real-valued continuous functional on the Banach space C(I)m of trajectories in R". These games are treated in our paper [3] .
Secondly, supposeF is a closed subset of R"+l such that
F is called the terminal set. Given a control function y(t) for J1 and a control function a(t) for Ja the conditions (2) and (3) imply there is a trajectory x(t) which satisfies (1) almost everywhere, and the condition (5) implies there is a smallest value oft, tF(x), such that (t, x(t)) E F. tF(x) will be called the capture time of the trajectory x(t). Suppose now that P is of the form P = At= 3 x(tp)) + s$(" Nt, x(t), r(t), Nt)) & (6) where as before h is continuous and g : Rmfl --t R is continuous. Such a game is called a game of survival (Friedman [fl) .
A particular case of a game of survival is obtained if we take g = 0 and h = 1 in (6). The payoff P is then just the capture time tF(x) so the player J1 , called the evader, is trying to avoid capture and make tF(x) as large as possible whilst Ja , the pursuer, is trying to make z~(x) as small as possible. Under these conditions G is called a pursuit+vas~on game. Finally, if g = 0 and h > 0 then G is called a generalized pursuit-evasion game.
STRATEGIES AND TTALUES
The problem of assigning a value to a differential game has been approached in at least three different ways [3-51. We shall follow a method first suggested by Roxin [ll] and adopted in our previous paper [3] . However, the reader should also be referred to the alternative definition given by Friedman [5] . It is not certain, except in the special case of fixed-duration games, that Friedman's concept of value coincides with the one used here.
A map CY : A, -+ &?i is a strategy for Ji if whenever zJt) = x2(t) a.e. to < t < t, then OF+(~) = m2(t) a.e. to < t < t, .
The set of strategies for J1 is denoted by r. We say a: E r is a delay strategy if there exists s > 0 such that whenever ,x1(t) = z2(t) a.e. to < t < t, then c%(t) = mdt> a.e. t, < t < min(T, ) t, + s).
The set of delay strategies is denoted by I', . The value for Q! E J' is defined as
We then define u(a) = inf(P(olx, x); x E As). From the definitions it is clear that V-< U, it also follows that U < V+. For if LY. E r and /3 E da then by an inductive construction one can find controls y(t) and x(t) such that olz =y, py = 2.
[As /3 is a delay strategy one can initially construct z(t) for t,, < t < t, + s, for some s. From this y(t) for to < t < t,, + s can be determined. This process is then repeated.] Thus Finally we quote the principal result from our paper [3] on games of fixed duration. (See also [2] and Friedman [8] .) We assume, therefore that the payoff is given by (4) . Define = mjnmyax(p*f+A)
forpER", xERnzand tel. Similarly F-(t, x, p) = my= mjn (P *f + 4, forpER*,xE@andtEL DEFINITION 3.1. The game is said to satisfy the Isaacs condition if F+(t, x, P) = F-(t, x, P). This is the main result, Theorem 10.1, of [3] . 4 . EXTENDED VALUES In this section we discuss an alternative concept of value convenient for games of survival. Our approach is slightly related to that of Friedman [q; however, the details differ considerably from those of Friedman.
Consider a game G defined by (l), (2), and (6). Define the real-valued function z on I by 4) = f" 4, x(s), Y(S), 44) ds and consider the map t --+ (x(t), s(t)) from I into Rm+l. Lemma 3.3 of [3] tells us that the set of all possible trajectories in R"+l is relatively compact in the Banach space of continuous R-l-valued functions on I. An approximate strategy A for player Jr is a sequence (a,) of delay strategies, i.e., 0~~ tz .P, for all n. Similarly, an approximate strategy B for Js is a sequence of delay strategies. Corresponding to a pair (A, B) we may determine a payoff as follows. Since DZ~ and & are each delay-strategies there exist unique -%I E&s, Yn E .k'I with 01,x, = yn and Pnyn = x, (see f3, Section 11-j). The controls (y,(t), z,(t)) induce a trajectory (zJt),q(t))
in Rr"+l. By the relative compactness of the set of possible trajectories the sequence (xJ,t), s%(t) has at least one accumulation point (z(t), Z(t)). For each such accumulation point we determine the payoff where f is the first time t^ 2 to with s(t) EF, the set of such payoffs is called thepayo#set P(A, B) of the pair A, B. Now define V,+ = inf sup (sup P(A, B)),
B A V,-= s;p tf (inf P (A, B) ). 02)
G is said to have extended value if V,+ = V,-(= V,). Further, a pair of approximate strategies (A*, B*) is an approximate saddle point if for any other pair (A, B) P(A, B*) < P(A*, B*) < P(A*, B) (where we say S, < S, for two subsets A',, S, of R if s, < sa whenever sI E 8, and ss E A',).
We now restrict attention to generalized pursuit-evasion games with a payoff given by where h > 0. We shall relate the extended value to properties of the ordinary value when the terminal set F is varied. For E > 0 let F, denote the set of (t, x) E Rm+l with p(t, X) = distance of (t, X) from F < E. Fe is then a closed subset of Rm+l. Consider the generalized pursuit-evasion game G, with terminal set F, replacing F. The upper and lower values of G, will be denoted by V+(F,) and V-(F,). Proof. Clearly, as B --+ 0, V+(F,) and V-(FE) increase to some limits Zr and 1s , respectively. It is, therefore, sufficient to consider the sequence V+(F,,,) and liT'-(F,,,). F or each n there exists a delay strategy /In* for the.pursuer Jz such that (where v, denotes the value in the game G&. Consider the approximate strategy B* = (fin*) and suppose A = (an) is an approximate strategy for the evader. Then there is a unique sequence y* E A!, with and (yra , /3,*yJ induces a trajectory (x,(t), I+) in Rm+l. Let t, be the time at which x,(t) first enters Fl,% so that we have Suppose (Qt), z%,(t)) is a convergent subsequence of the trajectories (x,(t), +Jt)) converging to the trajectory (g(t), Z(t)); we may suppose, selecting a further subsequence, that t4 ---f t for some t. Then we clearly have s(f) E F so that the payoff P of (z, Z) satisfies
13)
However, if B = (/3,) is any approximate strategy then for a fixed Q we may select control functions yn E A', with PE(Y, , PnYn) 2 v+(FJ -E. (14) Define A then to be the approximate strategy (an) where 01%~ = y* for any ZEJzTg.
Let (x~, 2,) be the sequence of trajectories of (A, B) and suppose some subsequence (x~, , So&) converges to the trajectory (2, G). If f is the first time at which (E, z(f)) is in F then P = G(i). For large enough R, (f, x+(t)) EF, so that So by (14) and taking limits lii V&+(F,) = Ve+, by the theorem so the result is immediate; similarly for V,-. In the special case of an ordinary pursuit-evasion game, where h = 1, we can interpret these results as follows. The game has upper value T+ if the pursuer can in any time T+ + E, E > 0, guarantee to force the evader into the terminal set. However, for the extended upper value T,+ the pursuer can in any time T,+ + E only guarantee to force the evader arbitrarily close to the terminal set.
EXTENDED VALUES IN GENERALIZED PURSUIT-EVASION GAMES
In a generalized pursuit-evasion game the pursuer's problem is to minimize the amount of "energy" where E > 0 is fixed. We make two assumptions on h: first we assume that h satisfies a Lipschitz condition in x, i.e., where, as in (2) ELLIOT AND KALTON s TO K,(t) dt < CO. to
We also assume that h is bounded away from zero, i.e., h(t, x, Y, z) b ho > 0 PO> for all (t, x, y, z) EI x R" x Y x 2. These two assumptions enable us to use results from the theory of fixed-time games on GE . Assumption (19) guarantees that the equation (17) Proof.
Let X denote the set of all possible trajectories; i.e., all solutions of (17) for measurable functions y(t) E A1 , a(t) E A2 . As observed in Section 4, X is relatively compact, so in particular the set of all attainable points in RW+l is bounded. Therefore, there is a uniform bound for f, i.e., We now show that pE is uniformly continuous on X. For E > 0 take 6 
If G satisfies (9) (the Isaacs condition) and (28) we shall say that G satisfies the extended Isaacs condition. Proof.
By Lemma 5.1 and the Tietze extension theorem we may suitably define ,uE off the space of possible trajectories in e, so that ,uE is continuous on C(I)m+l. Thus &E is a game of the type described by (l), (2) , and (4). Also, the Isaacs condition for & takes the form (29) so that, by Lemma 5.3, we can quote Theorem 3.2 to assert that eE has value, p(E).
The function h is bounded on the set of possible trajectories, and so for large enough E That is, p(E) = 0 for large enough E. Clearly p(E) decreases in E, so we make the following definition. 
THEOREM 5.6. If G is a generalized pursuit-evasion game satisfring (19) and (20) and the extended Isaacs condition, then G has extended value E*, i.e., v,+ = v,-= B".
Proof. Suppose E > 0. Then there is an El with El < E* + E and V(E,) = 0.
Hence, there exists a delay strategy /3 for the pursuer whose value v@) in GBz satisfies vq(P) G 6.
For any control function y(t) E ~&!r for the evader let (x(t), c(t)) be the trajectory corresponding to (y, py). Then pEJx(t), a(b)) < E and so for some tS, with t,, < t, < To, 4&l G 4 and
Now consider the delay strategy /3 in G, (see Section 4 above). By (31) the payoff P, corresponding to ( y, fiy) satisfies The conditions imposed on Gin Theorem 5.7 do not seem the best possible. Condition (19) a Lipschitz condition on h, is only necessary to ensure that G is of the same type of game as that studied in [3] . It would seem likely that this condition may be removed altogether. Another, apparently superfluous, condition is the reverse Isaacs condition (28). This condition is intuitively unnecessary for the existence of value, although its removal seems to present severe technical difficulties. However, the extended Isaacs condition is not too restrictive. Two main practical cases are covered by this condition: the case of separated variables studied by Friedman [5, 6 , 81 when and the case of relaxed controls studied by the authors and Markus [l, 31 (see Section 6 below). In both these cases Theorem 5.7 is valid. Lv.
The other inequality is similarly proved.
COROLLARY 6.5. In a relaxed game of survival V,-< V+ and V,+ > V-. If G has value and G has extended value, then they are equal. 
